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ABSTRACT  
 
This article addresses the challenge of managing uncertainty when producing estimative 
intelligence.  Much  of  the  theory  and  practice  of  estimative  intelligence  aims  to 
eliminate or reduce uncertainty, but this is often impossible or infeasible. This article 
instead argues that the goal of estimative intelligence should be to assess uncertainty. 
By drawing on a body of nearly 400 declassified National Intelligence Estimates as 
well as prominent texts on analytic tradecraft, this article argues that current tradecraft 
methods attempt to eliminate uncertainty in ways that can impede the accuracy, clarity, 
and  utility  of  estimative  intelligence.  By  contrast,  a  focus  on  assessing  uncertainty 
suggests solutions to these problems and provides a promising analytic framework for 
thinking about estimative intelligence in general. 
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ASSESSING UNCERTAINTY IN INTELLIGENCE 
 
Managing uncertainty  is essential to  making  foreign policy. To understand and  confront  the 
challenges facing the United States and its allies, policymakers need to make assumptions about 
the likelihood and potential consequences of various events and scenarios. A critical function of 
the intelligence community is to help policymakers form these assumptions, especially when 
they depend on factors that are uncertain and complex.  
When  intelligence  products  make  uncertain  judgments,  they  fall  under  the  category  of 
estimative intelligence. The production of estimative intelligence is a large and important subset 
of the intelligence process. It involves predicting the behavior of terrorist groups, determining 
the security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, judging China’s capabilities and intentions, assessing 
the risk of Iran building nuclear weapons, and addressing many other issues of great importance 
for international security. 
Any  analyst  studying  these  issues  would  wish  to  make  judgments  that  are  as  certain  as 
possible.  This  impulse,  however,  can  impair  the  accuracy,  clarity,  and  utility  of  intelligence 
estimates.  These  problems  frequently  fall  under  one  of  two  complementary  categories. 
Consequence neglect occurs when collectors, analysts, and consumers of intelligence focus too 
much  on  the  probability  of  each  possible  scenario  and  too  little  on  the  magnitude  of  those 
scenarios’  potential  consequences.  Probability  neglect  is  the  reverse  problem,  arising  when 
intelligence focuses predominantly on the potential consequences of various possibilities while 
giving less attention to their respective likelihoods. When likelihoods and consequences are not 
identified separately and then considered together, estimative intelligence will be incomplete, 
unclear, and subject to misinterpretation.  
The main argument in this article is that trying to eliminate uncertainty fosters these problems, 
while attempting to assess uncertainty helps to avoid them. In particular, the following sections 
argue against the view that analysts should view multiple possibilities as different and competing 
hypotheses;  discuss  the  way  that  the  concepts  of  likelihood  and  confidence  are  used  and 
sometimes  conflated;  and  describe  potential  shortcomings  in  the  way  that  information  is 
evaluated and filtered along the analytic chain. These subjects engage debates about the basic 
purposes and principles of intelligence estimating. They illuminate the challenges of dealing with 
uncertainty in intelligence, and provide an opportunity to discuss how those challenges can be 
addressed. 
 
Eliminating uncertainty versus assessing uncertainty 
Estimative  intelligence often  focuses on  issues that are  impossible to address with certainty. 
Matters such as the eventual outcome of the war in Afghanistan, or China’s stance toward the 
United States in fifteen years, or the ultimate result of political turmoil in Syria involve such a 2 
 
vast  range  of  factors  that  no  one  can  foresee  exactly  what  will  happen  in  each  instance. 
Estimative intelligence also deals with questions where certain answers are possible in principle, 
but infeasible in practice. A prominent example would be assessing the status of Iran’s nuclear 
program. It is theoretically possible to know this conclusively, but there are practical limits to 
obtaining  this  knowledge,  as  the  intelligence  community  lacks  direct  access  to  high-level 
officials and relevant facilities. Any intelligence analyst studying Iran’s nuclear program will 
have to work with incomplete information, and that information will not be sufficient to draw 
definitive conclusions.
1  
Of course, intelligence analysts will rarely possess determinative evidence about every aspect 
of  a  given  situation   –  almost  all  intelligence  products  entail  uncertainty  of  some  kind. 
Uncertainty is most important when analysts are wrestling with multiple possibilities that have 
meaningfully different implications for policy. This is the kind of challenge where estimative 
intelligence  can  play  an  important  role  in  helping  policymakers  to  form  and  revise  their 
assumptions, and it is the subject of this article.  
Roughly speaking, there are two distinct, ideal-type views about what the goals of estimative 
intelligence should be in dealing with this kind of uncertainty. One ideal-type view of estimative 
intelligence is that its goal should be to eliminate uncertainty, or at least to reduce it as much as 
possible.  In  this  view,  estimative  questions  have  correct  answers.  Those  answers  might  be 
difficult  to  ascertain,  but  the  analyst’s  goal  should  be  to  make  the  strongest  possible 
determination about what those answers are. As analysts gain information and improve their 
conceptual frameworks, they should be able to reduce the amount of uncertainty they face. The 
more uncertainty that remains, the more this indicates that analysts need better information or 
better concepts. 
This view of intelligence is widespread. A recent ethnography of the intelligence community 
found that many analysts believe intelligence errors are ‘factual inaccuracies resulting from poor 
or missing data’ or from  ‘incorrect, missing, discarded, or inadequate hypotheses’.
2  Another 
scholar argues that  Americans have  an  ‘unbounded  faith’  in  the  ability  of  the  intelligence 
                                                   
1 A related example was the intelligence community’s ten-year effort to locate Osama bin Laden. There 
was a correct answer to the question of where bin Laden was hiding, but uncertainty about bin Laden’s 
location remained even up to the point where President Obama authorized a raid against his compound.  
2 Rob Johnston, Analytic Culture in the U.S. Intelligence Community (Washington, DC: Center for the 
Study of Intelligence 2005), p.xviii. Cf. Michael Heazle, ‘Policy Lessons from Iraq on Managing 
Uncertainty in Intelligence Assessment: Why the Strategic/Tactical Distinction Matters’, Intelligence and 
National Security 25/3 (2010), p.297, which refers to a similar aspect of analytic culture that the author 
calls ‘positivist perceptions of knowledge’ expressed as ‘the truth is out there and it can be known’. This 
aspect of analytic culture is as old as the estimative process itself. Roger Hilsman, Jr., ‘Intelligence and 
Policy-Making in Foreign Affairs’, World Politics 5/1 (1952), pp.11 and 13, criticizes ‘the implied 
assumption… that truth is obvious once all the facts are known’, a point of view ‘accepted with so little 
question’. 3 
 
community to ‘hold accurate images of the outside world’.
3 This perspective has understandable 
appeal. Certainty simplifies decision making. It is not surprising that consumers of intelligence 
wish to have it, and that producers of intelligence seek to provide it. As the following sections 
will show, a push to eliminate or reduce uncertainty characterizes many standard methods of 
intelligence analysis. 
A  second  ideal-type  view  of  estimative  intelligence  is  that  its  goal  should  be  to  assess 
uncertainty. In this view, it makes little sense to seek a single ‘right answer’ to many estimative 
questions. In fact, good intelligence often reveals new uncertainties: as analysts gain information 
and improve their conceptual frameworks, they may identify additional possibilities that they had 
not previously considered. That should not be seen as a problem, since the goal of intelligence is 
to describe the uncertainty that surrounds a particular question, and not to eliminate or to reduce 
this uncertainty per se. 
Since  the  very  definition  of  estimative  intelligence  is  that  it  involves  making  uncertain 
judgments, it would seem as though the subject inherently belongs in this second category. Yet 
while  the  theory  and  practice  of  estimative  intelligence  often  appear  to  favor  assessing 
uncertainty in an accurate manner, many standard practices actually push in a different direction, 
albeit in ways that are often subtle and possibly unintended. 
For example, scholars and practitioners often speak about evaluating intelligence in terms of 
an analyst’s ‘batting average’. Many authors argue that the batting average is an appropriate 
metaphor because it accepts the idea that intelligence estimates, like baseball players, will fall 
short much of the time. Flawless performance is an unreasonable goal, but analysts should at 
least try to ‘raise the batting average’ of their intelligence estimates.
4 This metaphor is explicitly 
aimed to avoid pressuring analysts to state their estimates with certainty. 
This  proposal, though seemingly intuitive , is misguided  –  for  if  analysts  truly  wished  to 
maximize their batting averages, then they would end up offering judgments that are as certain as 
possible. To see this, consider a situation in which an analyst might have been asked in spring 
2012 to predict whether or not unrest in Syria would unseat Bashar al-Assad within the year. Say 
she believed it was 60 percent likely that al-Assad would stay and 40 percent likely that al-Assad 
would go. Now imagine that the analyst would be scored based on whether she got her prediction 
                                                   
3 Paul R. Pillar levels this critique in his book Intelligence and U.S. Foreign Policy: Iraq, 9/11, and 
Misguided Reform (NY: Columbia 2011), p.4. 
4 For examples, see Allen Dulles, The Craft of Intelligence (NY: Harper and Row 1963), p.155; Harold P. 
Ford, Estimative Intelligence: The Purposes and Problems of National Intelligence Estimating (Lanham, 
MD: Defense Intelligence College 1993), p.86; Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 
4
th ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press 2009), p.148; Kristan J. Wheaton, ‘Evaluating Intelligence: 
Answering Questions Asked and Not’, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 
22/4 (2009), pp.614-631; John A. Gentry, ‘Assessing Intelligence Performance’ in Loch K. Johnson (ed.), 
Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence (NY: Oxford 2010); Thomas J. Fingar, Reducing 
Uncertainty: Intelligence Analysis and National Security (Stanford: 2011), p.3. 4 
 
right. One way to do this would be to ask her to make a single prediction. If this prediction 
turned out to be correct, the analyst would earn a ‘hit’. Of course, the analyst would then predict 
al-Assad will stay, since she believes this to be the most likely outcome, resulting in an expected 
score of 0.6 x 1.0 = 0.6. This is a certain, single-outcome prediction. In order to encourage this 
analyst  to  take  multiple  outcomes  into  account,  one  might  instead  ask  her  to  assess  the 
likelihoods both that al-Assad will stay and that al-Assad will go. To give her an incentive to 
make an accurate assessment, one could say that if she predicted these outcomes with respective 
probabilities of 60 percent and 40 percent, then she would earn 0.6 ‘points’ if al-Assad stayed 
and 0.4 ‘points’ if al-Assad left. But then her expected score would fall to 0.6 x 0.6 + 0.4 x 0.4 = 
0.52. This is less than the expected score of 0.6 that the analyst would get by simply stating that 
al-Assad will stay in power. A self-interested analyst aiming to maximize her expected payoff 
would place all the probability on the outcome she believes to be most likely.
5 
Thus  the  batting-average  metaphor,  despite  appearing   to  promote  the  careful  study  of 
uncertainty,  actually  provides  incentives to  make all-or-nothing predictions. This  dissuades 
analysts from studying possibilities that are unlikely  but important, and it is thus an example of 
consequence neglect. Few people would have predicted in the summer of 2010 that t here was a 
substantial  risk  of   regime-threatening  uprisings  throughout  the  Middle  Ea st.  An  analyst 
concerned with her batting average would have had little reason to study these possibilities, and 
this might have caused her to miss important warning signs of instability.
6  
This  article  demonstrates  that the batting-average metaphor is  not  alone in  superficially 
embracing the assessment of uncertainty while following a logic that is actually  very different.
7 
                                                   
5 This is not to say that the analyst stakes her entire reputation on each estimate, but rather to point out 
that the strategy which maximizes the analyst’s payoff across many predictions is to make single-outcome 
judgments on each one. 
6 For a related example regarding the fall of the Shah of Iran, see Robert Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails: 
Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 2010), ch.2. On consequence 
neglect more generally, see Alan Berger et al., ‘The Five Neglects: Risks Gone Amiss’ in Howard 
Kunreuther and Michael Useem (eds.), Learning from Catastrophes (Philadelphia, PA: Wharton 2010), 
pp.83-99. 
7 Similarly, Mark Lowenthal’s book, Intelligence, contains thoughtful analyses of many issues raised in 
this article. But he also writes (p.148) that the ‘accuracy’ of a prediction should be judged according to 
whether its likelihood is ‘something more than 50 percent and something less than 100 percent’ – even 
though it can, of course, be perfectly accurate to say that something has a probability lower than 50 
percent. Ford’s Estimative Intelligence reinforces many of this article’s themes, while at the same time 
stating that ‘one of the main purposes of national intelligence estimating is to lessen policymakers’ 
uncertainties about the world’(p.179). Richard K. Betts’s article, ‘Analysis, War, and Decision: Why 
Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable,’ World Politics 31/1 (1978), pp.61-89 is one of the most well-cited 
treatments of the dangers of making estimates with too much certainty, yet he does imply that certainty 
should be the goal: ‘It is the role of intelligence to extract certainty from uncertainty’(p.69). Kristan 
Wheaton’s article, ‘The Revolution Begins on Page Five: The Changing Nature of NIEs’, International 
Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 25/2 (2012), pp.330-349 discusses the challenges of 
conveying uncertainty in an accurate fashion, but states (p.331) that the purpose of National Intelligence 
Estimates is ultimately ‘to reduce national security policymakers’ level of uncertainty’. 5 
 
The  following  sections  highlight  similar  tensions  in  other  aspects of  intelligence  theory  and 
tradecraft.  
To  provide  empirical  support  for  its  discussion,  this  article  examines  a  broad  range  of 
National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs). Though NIEs comprise only a small fraction of overall 
estimative intelligence, their production is so highly scrutinized that it is reasonable to assume 
that their flaws would characterize lower-profile estimates as well.
8 In addition to examining 
more than a dozen  specific estimates, the following sections describe general patterns across a 
database of 379 declassified NIEs that were written be tween 1964  and 1994 and that were  
released through the Central Intelligence Agency’s Historical Review Program.
9 Throughout the 
following sections, this combination of deductive and inductive analysis helps to draw out the 
tensions between eliminating uncertainty and assessing uncertainty in estimative intelligence. 
 
Analyzing Alternatives 
Intelligence  analysts  often  wrestle  with  alternatives.  To return  to the  example  of  an  analyst 
studying Syria in 2012, this analyst would have had to consider a wide range of possibilities. If 
al-Assad were to survive the year, his domestic and international standing could presumably 
change in any number of ways. If al-Assad left power, the transition might be stable but it might 
also descend into widespread violence, while al-Assad’s eventual successors could be relatively 
friendly or hostile to the United States. There are many relevant scenarios here. An intelligence 
analyst who seeks to eliminate uncertainty would argue that one of them constitutes the ‘correct 
answer’, and that her ideal goal should be to identify what that answer is. Intelligence tradecraft 
often encourages this kind of thinking when it comes to analyzing alternative possibilities.  
When estimates focus on a single possibility, it is called ‘single-outcome forecasting’. This 
practice has been criticized for some time, because analysts often have insufficient information 
for  making  definitive  predictions,  and  because  policymakers  should  be  aware  of  a  range  of 
potential  contingencies.
10  Yet even when analyst s do consider multiple possibilities , several 
elements of standard practice reveal a tendency to assume that one of those scenarios should be 
considered the most important or the most correct. 
                                                   
8 As one intelligence scholar recently stated, ‘The NIE is arguably the highest form of the intelligence 
art’. Wheaton, ‘The Revolution Begins on Page Five’, p.340. A recent discussion of NIEs can be found in 
Loch K. Johnson, The Threat on the Horizon: An Inside Account of America’s Search for National 
Security after the Cold War (NY: Oxford 2011), pp.164-85. 
9 There are actually 426 entries in the database, but 47 were dropped for various reasons: some entries are 
not estimates but update memoranda, some remain heavily classified, and some appear in the database 
twice. The database was accessed through <foia.cia.gov> between October 2010 and May 2011. 
10 See, for example, Willis C. Armstrong et al., ‘The Hazards of Single-Outcome Forecasting’, Studies in 
Intelligence 28/3 (1984), pp.57-70. 6 
 
For instance, most NIEs highlight a ‘Best Estimate’ or ‘Key Judgments’. In principle, calling 
some estimates ‘Best’ does not exclude the idea that there are other possibilities. Meanwhile, the 
Key Judgments section of an NIE is generally intended to serve the function of an executive 
summary, so it does not inherently privilege one alternative over another. In practice, however, 
these sections often highlight a subset of relevant possibilities and encourage consumers to give 
these possibilities special attention. NIEs typically present their judgments in sequence, often 
with one or two possibilities receiving the bulk of explanation and support.  Many NIEs contain 
a distinct section enumerating ‘Alternatives’ that often receive relatively limited discussion. 
This treatment can suggest that certain alternative views are relatively insignificant, and the 
2002  NIE  on  Iraq’s  Continuing  Programs  for  Weapons  of  Mass  Destruction  serves  as  a 
prominent  example.  The  Key  Judgments  section  of  this  NIE  begins  with  42  paragraphs 
supporting the assessment that Iraq  ‘has continued  its weapons of  mass destruction (WMD) 
programs’  and  that  ‘if  left  unchecked,  it  probably  will  have  a  nuclear  weapon  during  this 
decade’. That conclusion, as  is  now widely known, was  based on controversial  information. 
Doubts about the NIE’s main judgment were raised in a two-paragraph text box at the end of the 
opening section, arguing that the evidence does not ‘add up to a compelling case that Iraq is 
currently pursuing… an integrated and comprehensive approach to acquire nuclear weapons’. It 
is almost impossible to miss this objection – but it is equally difficult to miss the disparity in 
emphasis between these very different points of view about Iraq’s nuclear program. 
The  tendency  to  privilege  particular  judgments  goes  beyond  the  structure  of  intelligence 
estimates.  Ironically,  it  permeates  many  of  the  conceptual  frameworks  that  are  intended  to 
encourage  analysts  to  consider  multiple  possibilities  in  the  first  place.  For  instance,  one 
prominent text on analytic tradecraft recommends that analysts approach complex questions by 
generating  multiple  hypotheses,  evaluating  the  ‘credibility’  of  each  hypothesis,  sorting 
hypotheses ‘from most credible to least credible’, and then ‘select[ing] from the top of the list 
those hypotheses most deserving of attention’.
11 Though its authors intend for this method of 
‘multiple hypothesis generation’ to ensure that important alternatives do not get overlooked, the 
instruction  to  focus  on  the  ‘most  credible’  predictions  indicates  an  assumption  that  unlikely 
possibilities are less ‘deserving of attention’. Yet that is often untrue. The most consequential 
events (such as major terrorist attacks, the outbreak of conventional wars, and the collapse of 
state governments) are often perceived as unlikely before they occur, yet they can have such 
enormous impact that they deserve serious consideration. The overall significance of any event is 
a product of its probability and its consequences, and so both of these factors must be considered 
when comparing alternative scenarios.  
To give another example, many intelligence analysts are trained in a practice called Analysis 
of Competing Hypotheses (ACH). ACH seems to embrace the goal of assessing uncertainty. It 
                                                   
11 Richards J. Heuer and Randolph H. Pherson, Structured Analytic Techniques for Intelligence Analysis 
(Washington, DC: CQ Press 2011), ch.7.1. 7 
 
instructs analysts to form a matrix of potential hypotheses and available information that helps to 
show how much evidence supports (or contradicts) each possibility. This practice combats first 
impressions and promotes alternative thinking.
12 Yet the word ‘Competing’ is important here. 
Competing for what? The original description of ACH explains its goal as being to determine 
‘Which of several possible explanations is the correct one? Which of several possible outcomes 
is the most likely one?’
13 A recent manual introduces ACH as a tool for ‘selecting the hypothesis 
that  best  fits  the  evidence’.
14  To  this  end,  ACH  instructs  analysts  to  ‘focus  on  disproving 
hypotheses’.
15 This does not mean that ACH always generates single-outcome estimates, and the 
method is designed to indicate places where the evidence sustains multiple interpretations. When 
this occurs, ACH tells analysts to rank remaining possibilities from ‘weakest’ to ‘strongest’. 
An analyst seeking to assess uncertainty would approach the issue differently. She would not 
see the relevant  possibilities as rival or  competing. She would say that no possibility  merits 
attention  for  being  ‘correct’  and  that  focusing  on  disproving  hypotheses  places  unnecessary 
emphasis on eliminating relevant scenarios from consideration. Moreover, she would argue that 
it makes little sense to say that any possibility is ‘weak’ or ‘strong’ so long as analysts accurately 
assess its likelihood.
16 This is not to claim that all scenarios have equal significance. But to 
repeat, the  significance of  any possibility  is  the product  of its  likelihood  and  its  potential 
consequences.  For  that  reason,  ACH’s  method  of  ranking  hypotheses  based  on  probability 
exposes analysts to consequence neglect. 
Other  prominent  analytic  methods  introduce  similar  tensions.  In  some  cases,  analysts  are 
instructed to choose and flesh out their best estimate, with critiques and alternatives raised later 
as the estimate receives formal review. In other cases, the process of considering alternatives is 
deliberately adversarial or contrarian from the start, relying on ‘devil’s advocates’ or dividing 
analysts into ‘Team A/Team B’ groupings, so as to foster a clash of viewpoints.
17  
These methods  help to ensure that  diverse perspectives  are considered during the analytic 
process, and this is a valuable goal. Nevertheless, these methods still imply that hypotheses are 
rivals, and that they must compete with each other for  pride of place. And the standards for 
                                                   
12 U.S. Government, A Tradecraft Primer: Structured Analytic Techniques for Improving Intelligence 
Analysis (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office 2009), p.14. 
13 Heuer, The Psychology of Intelligence Analysis (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence 
1999), p.95. 
14 Heuer and Pherson, Structured Analytic Techniques, p.160. 
15 U.S. Government, Tradecraft Primer, p.15. 
16 By way of analogy, if the best economic models predict a ten percent chance of a recession in a given 
year, then this does not constitute a ‘weak possibility’ or a scenario that should be disproved. The 
important thing for economic forecasters (both in the private and the public sectors) is to assess the 
chances of recession accurately. The same is true for doctors assessing potential complications during 
surgery, meteorologists predicting the chances of inclement weather, and experts in many other fields. 
17 More broadly, an increasing amount of recent intelligence work has been devoted to techniques of 
‘competitive analysis,’ which are designed to pit different viewpoints against one another. See Richard L. 
Russell, ‘Competitive Analysis’ in Johnson (ed.), Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence. 8 
 
judging these competitions – for determining which judgments are truly the ‘best’ – are often 
subjective and contentious. For instance, the NIE, Likelihood of an Attempted Shoot-Down of a 
U-2 (1964) predicts a ‘significant and, over time, growing threat’ of a spy plane coming under 
fire.  The  NIE,  South  Africa:  Weathering  the  Storm  (1992)  argues  that  ‘The  recent  surge  in 
factional violence and the African National Congress (ANC) suspension of talks have dealt the 
negotiation  process  a  serious  –  but  we  believe  not  fatal  –  blow’.  But  what  constitutes  a 
‘significant threat’ or a ‘fatal blow’? Reasonable people can disagree on these issues, and a wide 
range of intelligence literature addresses similar questions of how analysts should know when to 
‘sound the alarm’ about potential threats, and when they should refrain from ‘crying wolf’. As 
one scholar writes, these debates are ‘in effect theological disputes’ and they can lead to a great 
deal of friction among analysts and the agencies they represent.
18  
Yet these disputes are only relevant to the extent that analysts believe that t hey need to judge 
whether or not some threat is  ‘significant’ enough to warrant policymakers’ attention. Consider 
instead a situation where analysts see no reason to highlight any particular prediction relative to 
the alternatives. If the analyst seeks simply to describe several relevant possibilities, along with 
their respective  likelihoods and potential  consequences, then  that obviates the  need to make 
value judgments about whether some threat is ‘significant’. 
A good example of this kind of analysis is the NIE, The Deepening Crisis in the USSR (1990). 
A  single  figure  from  this  document  –  which  is  reproduced  at  the  end  of  this  article  as  an 
appendix – lays out four different ‘scenarios for the next year’. Each scenario receives two or 
three explanatory bullet points along with a ‘Rough Probability’. The most likely scenario is 
presented first, but none is given more attention than the others. This NIE avoids both probability 
neglect and consequence neglect; it conveys no notion that one possibility deserves pride of 
place as being the best or most correct; it does not require analysts or readers to debate the 
meaning of concepts like ‘significant’, ‘serious’, or ‘important’; and it allows readers to decide 
for themselves which possibilities to prioritize. Moreover, even though the figure contains a wide 
range of information, it is still clear and concise.  
Yet this kind of multi-faceted estimate is rare. Of the 379 declassified NIEs surveyed for this 
article, 200 (53 percent) examine a single possibility without explaining potential alternatives. 
Only 112 (30 percent) explicitly consider three or more possible judgments. The next section 
also demonstrates how the Deepening Crisis NIE is especially rare in the way it conveys the 
estimated likelihood of each potential scenario in a reasonably precise fashion. 
A  delineation  of  multiple  possibilities  with  attached  likelihoods  is  called  a  probability 
distribution.  This  is  one  of  the  cornerstone  concepts  of  decision  theory,  a  field  that  was 
                                                   
18 Betts, Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge and Power in American National Security (NY: Columbia 
2007), p.101. 9 
 
developed to help  individuals  make effective choices under uncertainty.
19 The goal of using 
probability distributions (such as the example in this article’s appendix) is to state clearly the 
likelihoods and potential consequences that are associated with relevant scenarios. This provides 
information that is important to managing uncertainty in many professions.
20  
Using probability distributions removes the inclination to believe that alternative views  are 
necessarily at odds with each  other. A probability distribution is not a collection of competing 
hypotheses:  it  is  a  single  hypothesis  about  the  way  uncertainty  is  spread  across  multiple 
possibilities. The presence of multiple possibilities does not indicate disagreement, dissent, or 
confusion. None of these possibilities is either right or wrong. The true best estimate is the one 
that accurately describes the distribution of possibilities and their likelihoods, the equivalent of 
well-calibrated odds in a horse race.  
This perspective is the bedrock of attempting to assess uncertainty, and it avoids many pitfalls 
in existing tradecraft. For instance, when analysts attempt to ‘make the call’ about which of 
several possibilities is the best or most important, they often subconsciously view subsequent 
evidence in ways that support this preconceptions.
21 But confirmation bias  should only be an 
issue when analysts are under pressure to identify and support  a subset of possibilities. If the 
analyst were to view the entire probability distribution as a single , coherent hypothesis, then 
there would be no reason to confirm one part of it to the exclusion of the rest. Similarly, the goal 
of assessing uncertainty reduces the need for analysts to  serve as advocates. When alternative 
possibilities  need not  compete,  the  risk that  certain  points of view  will be  marginalized  is 
reduced. So long as analysts properly assess the likelihood of each possibility, there is no reason 
to think that  one is any  more valid than others .  In short, the  likelihood  of  a  hypothesis  is 
something different from the validity of a hypothesis, but intelligence tradecraft often conflates 
these attributes. 
                                                   
19 A fundamental introductory text on this subject is Howard Raiffa’s Decision Analysis: Introductory 
Lectures on Choices under Uncertainty (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley 1968). A more recent text is 
John W. Pratt, Raiffa, and Robert Schlaifer, Introduction to Statistical Decision Theory (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT 1995). See also Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky (eds.), Judgment under 
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (NY: Cambridge University Press 1982) and Kahneman, Thinking 
Fast and Slow (NY: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux 2011) which examines behavioral aspects of decision 
making under uncertainty and discuss ways to mitigate relevant problems. 
20 The decision theory literature often deals with subjects such as doctors prescribing medical treatments, 
business executives making economic forecasts, and gamblers assessing their prospects. In these cases 
and many others, decision makers face uncertainties about the current and future states of the world that 
will influence their choice of action. Sherman Kent explains how intelligence analysis and foreign policy 
relate to other kinds of decision making under uncertainty in Strategic Intelligence for American World 
Policy (Hamden, CT: Archon 1965), pp.58-61. See also Walter Laqueur, ‘The Question of Judgment: 
Intelligence and Medicine’, Journal of Contemporary History 18/4 (1983), pp.533-548; Charles Weiss, 
‘Communicating Uncertainty in Intelligence and Other Professions’, International Journal of Intelligence 
and CounterIntelligence 2/11 (2008), pp.57-85; and David T. Moore, Sensemaking: A Structure for an 
Intelligence Revolution (Washington, DC: National Defense Intelligence College 2011), pp.95-99. 
21 Heuer, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, ch.10. 10 
 
Critics  of  the  probability  distribution  approach  might  argue  that  it  induces  too  much 
complexity by having analysts identify a larger range of possibilities, but this is not true. The 
probability  distribution  simply  imposes  structure  on  what  many  analysts  do  anyway.  For 
instance, the NIE, Cuba’s Changing International Role (1975) predicts that ‘there is a better-
than-even chance that a partial reduction in the scope of US sanctions would be enough to lead 
Castro  to  engage  in  substantive  negotiations’.  This  indicates  that  there  are  alternative  ways 
Castro might respond to reduced sanctions. The combined likelihood of these alternatives might 
even approach 50 percent. These possibilities comprise what decision theorists sometimes call a 
catch-all hypothesis, covering any contingency not otherwise mentioned. Does it make matters 
more  complex  to  explain  what  the  catch-all  hypothesis  entails?  On  the  contrary,  if  analysts 
explain these alternatives – even in a concise format like the figure in this article’s appendix – it 
would help to clarify what these analysts are saying already.   
Moving from judgments to distributions brings an additional benefit: it reduces pressures to 
‘water down’ estimates in order to achieve consensus. Intelligence analysts often complain about 
this pressure, which is amplified by the notion that a subset of the relevant possibilities should be 
emphasized or given pride of place. This creates a tendency to broaden estimative judgments in 
order  to  accommodate  different  views.
22  Because techniques such as AC H revolve around 
settling on some answers to the relative exclusion of others, analysts are explicitly instructed to 
ask questions  like  ‘Does  it  make  sense  to  combine  two  hypotheses  into  one?’
23  Framing 
estimates  in  terms  of  probability  distributions  dampens  the  incentive  to  do this.  If  different 
possibilities need not compete, and if no possibility receives a special imprimatur, then there is 
no reason to hedge, merge, or exclude particular views.  
This is another way in which the probability distribution not only provides more information 
than  standard approaches,  but  it also  lessens the difficulty of  producing and presenting that 
information, by removing prominent grounds for disagreement. And while analysts will no doubt 
disagree  about  the  probability  that  should  be  attached  to  each  of  several  possibilities,  this 
challenge is already a prominent element of intelligence analysis, and that is the subject of the 
next section.  
 
 
 
                                                   
22 Ford, in Estimative Intelligence (p.21 cf. pp.78, 101) writes that NIEs are often criticized for being 
‘wishy-washy’, because the coordination process tends to produce ‘coordinated mush’. His rough 
dichotomy between mush and split decisions, however, is a dichotomy that is not necessary when 
thinking in terms of probability distributions, rather than of discrete, single-outcome judgments. Cf. 
Gregory Treverton, Reshaping National Intelligence for an Age of Information (Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND 2001), p.204; Roger Z. George, ‘Beyond Analytic Tradecraft’, International Journal of 
Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 23/2 (2010), pp.300-301; Betts, Enemies of Intelligence, pp.32, 101. 
23 Heuer and Pherson, Structured Analytic Techniques, p.163. 11 
 
Likelihood and confidence 
Intelligence estimates often use the terms likelihood and confidence. These concepts differ, and 
it is important to keep them separate. As the 2007 NIE, Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities 
explains,  ‘estimates  of  likelihood’  constitute  ‘probabilistic  language’  framing  an  analyst’s 
judgments.  But  since  analysts  typically  estimate  likelihood  based  on  evidence  that  is  both 
incomplete and ambiguous, it is useful to assess how reliable those estimates may be. For that 
purpose, the Iran NIE defines a ‘high confidence’ assessment as one that is  based on  ‘high 
quality’ information; a ‘moderate confidence’ assessment ‘generally means that the information 
is credibly sourced and plausible  but not of sufficient quality or corroborated sufficiently to 
warrant a higher level of confidence’; and a ‘low confidence’ assessment relies on evidence that 
is ‘too fragmented or poorly corroborated to make solid analytic inferences’. In short, likelihood 
describes the probability that analysts assign to some judgment. Confidence is then a way of 
qualifying that statement by describing the ‘scope, quality, and sourcing’ that supports it. 
This is a reasonable classification, but it is not the way that the concepts of likelihood and 
confidence are actually used in the Iran NIE. For example, here is the opening paragraph of the 
NIE’s Key Judgments: 
We  judge  with  high  confidence  that  in  fall  2003,  Tehran  halted  its  nuclear  weapons 
program; we also assess with moderate-to-high confidence that Tehran at a minimum is 
keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons. We judge with high confidence that 
the  halt,  and  Tehran’s  announcement  of  its  decision  to  suspend  its  declared  uranium 
enrichment  program  and  sign  an  Additional  Protocol  to  its  Nuclear  Non-Proliferation 
Treaty  Safeguards  Agreement,  was  directed  primarily  in  response  to  increasing 
international scrutiny and pressure resulting from exposure of Iran’s previously undeclared 
nuclear work. 
Throughout this paragraph, confidence is not being used to qualify expressions of likelihood. 
Rather, it is being used to make expressions of likelihood. In all, the Key Judgments section of 
the Iran NIE uses the term ‘confidence’ 19 times in order to convey the probability that some 
statement is true.
24 The Key Judgments express likelihoods in several places, too.
25 But there is 
no instance where the NIE conveys both the probability  and the confidence that the authors 
                                                   
24 For example, ‘We assess with high confidence that until fall 2003, Iranian military entities were 
working under government direction to develop nuclear weapons’; ‘We judge with high confidence that 
the halt lasted at least several years’; ‘We continue to assess with moderate-to-high confidence that Iran 
does not currently have a nuclear weapon’. 
25 It seems as though the real operative distinction between words of  likelihood and words of confidence 
in the Iran NIE is that the latter are used to make predictions about events that had already happened 
(such as whether or not Iran had stopped and/or restarted its nuclear research) while the former is used to 
make predictions about the future (e.g., ‘Iran probably would use covert facilities’ for a given purpose; 
‘Iran probably would be technically capable’ of producing a weapon in a given time frame).  12 
 
assign  to  some  prediction,  even  though  the  NIE’s  front  matter  explains  why  those  concepts 
convey different, important ideas. 
This tendency to conflate likelihood and confidence follows logically from the perspective 
that estimative questions have right answers, and that an analyst should seek to define those 
answers with minimal uncertainty. With this goal in mind, it is reasonable to think that likelihood 
and confidence converge. To the extent that an analyst believes a particular estimate is likely to 
be correct, this means she has a relatively large amount of relatively sound evidence to support 
that assessment. To the extent that the analyst attaches a low likelihood to an assessment, this 
indicates that there  is relatively  little or relatively unreliable  information to support it. If an 
analyst is striving to achieve certainty, then it makes sense to use the language of confidence 
when talking about the concept of likelihood. 
An analyst who aims to assess uncertainty would have a very different perspective. She would 
argue that estimative questions rarely have single, right answers, and even if they do (the status 
of Iran’s current nuclear program is in principle a knowable fact), the available evidence is often 
ambiguous enough to sustain multiple interpretations.
26 Either way, likelihood and confidence 
are different concepts. If an analyst aims to assess uncertainty, then it is  perfectly logical to be 
highly confident that some outcome should be viewed in probabilistic terms.  
Consider some hypothetical cases. An analyst should be highly confident when stating that the 
odds of a coin flip coming up heads are one in two, and that the odds of drawing a face card from 
a shuffled deck are three in thirteen.
27 The chances of a U.S. bomber striking its target from high 
altitude are much less precise, but they can also be estimated in rigorous ways that analysts can 
discuss  with relatively high levels of confidence .  And while any prediction s  about  political 
turmoil will be less reliable still, there are some aspects of the situation that analysts can judge 
more confidently than others. For example, analysts in the spring of 2012 could presumably state 
with confidence that the chances were low that Bashar al-Assad would finish the year in power 
and restore the international standing he lost during the crisis. Analysts would presumably have 
had less confidence in any predictions that they made about the likelihood that al-Assad will be 
ousted. They would probably have been even less confident in their predictions about the odds 
that any given candidate would be al-Assad’s successor. That does not mean that analysts should 
shy away from making these kinds of assessments. It only means that analysts need to convey 
both the probability and the confidence associates with their estimates. 
Melding confidence and likelihood not only leaves intelligence analysis incomplete, but it also 
clouds what that analysis means. When the Iran NIE assessed ‘with moderate confidence’ that 
‘Tehran had not restarted its nuclear weapons program as of mid-2007’, did this reflect that the 
                                                   
26 None of this discussion implies that intelligence collectors should not seek to eliminate uncertainty. But 
when analysts confront uncertainty, they must assess their information in light of its limitations. 
27 High confidence implies the estimate will change little in response to new information, such as close 
inspection of the coin. This is an important point to which the article returns below. 13 
 
odds that Iran was currently pursuing nuclear weapons more like 20 percent or 60 percent? And 
was the term ‘confidence’ being used here to represent inferences about likelihood, or to qualify 
the reliability of those inferences?  
These  kinds  of  concepts  and  terms  have  received  much  debate  within  the  intelligence 
community  in  recent  years,  and  the  NIEs  surveyed  for  this  article  provide  some  historical 
context.
28 Of the 379 declassified NIEs surveyed for this article, only 16 (four percent) discuss 
probability using quantitative indicators of any kind. This category was coded broadly to include 
not only percentages, but also bettors’ odds such as ‘1 in 5’, as well as statements like ‘close to 
even’.
29 70 NIEs (18 percent) discuss a range of potential outcomes but do not give even a 
qualitative sense of their probabilities:  saying,  for instance, that some outcome  is the  ‘most 
likely’ but not conveying what its likelihood actually is.
30 The Deepening Crisis NIE discussed 
in the previous section is the only one of the 379 NIEs surveyed for this article that discussed 
more than two potential outcomes and that described their probabilities numerically.
31  
Expressing a quantitative phenomenon  in qualitative terms – or not expressing it at all – is 
unavoidably vague. And in many respects, such vagueness is unnecessary. For example, the Iran 
NIE defines seven different terms for expressing likelihood, and arranges them on a spectrum. 
The word ‘remote’ is at the extreme left of this spectrum, such that it is reasonable to think that 
the term should only apply to events whose likelihood of occurring is less than 10 percent. The 
word ‘very likely’ is placed on the right end of the spectrum, at a position indicating a likelihood 
of  perhaps  75  percent.  In  order  to  know  which  term  to  use,  analysts  need  to  estimate 
probabilities, so that they go to the right place on the spectrum and pick the word that appears 
most appropriate. Why not simply report those probability estimates in the first place?
32  
                                                   
28 See Wheaton, ‘The Revolution Begins on Page Five’ for a recent and thorough discussion of this 
debate, which also covers the 2007 Iran NIE. 
29 For example, Prospects for the South African Transition (1994) estimates a 70 percent chance that an 
election will occur on schedule; Russia Over the Next Four Years (1992) traces several contingencies and 
identifies the chances of two of them as ‘slightly better than even’ and ‘one in three’; and Soviet Ballistic 
Missile Defense (1982) assesses the odds that the Soviets will abrogate the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty at 
10-20 percent. 
30 For instance, several estimates discuss different ‘illustrative force models’ for how Soviet strategic 
forces might evolve without giving a sense of the likelihood that each model is correct. Examples of NIEs 
that lay out more than three possible scenarios while providing the reader with almost no sense of their 
likelihoods include Soviet Policy toward the West (1989); The Changing Sino-Soviet Relationship (1985); 
and Soviet Military Options in the Middle East (1975).  
31 This is not to say that other estimates do not share some of its characteristics. For instance the NIE 
Implications of Alternative Soviet Futures (1991) presents a range of potential scenarios in a concise 
table, though without explicit probabilities. The NIE Russia over the Next Four Years (1992) gives 
numeric probabilities over three or more possible outcomes but does not present the information in a 
concise table. 
32 Sherman Kent wrote one of the earliest and best-known articles on this subject: ‘Words of Estimative 
Probability’, Studies in Intelligence 8/4 (1964); more recent examples include Weiss, ‘Communicating 14 
 
The most common explanation for why analysts smudge probabilities in this way is that they 
wish to avoid giving their estimates an undue appearance of precision. But this is exactly why it 
is important to convey both likelihood and confidence when making a prediction. For instance, 
the Iran NIE discusses whether Tehran might enrich enough uranium to make a nuclear weapon 
by  2013.  The  estimate  states  that  ‘Iran  is  unlikely  to  achieve  this  capability…  because  of 
foreseeable technical and programmatic problems’. Here are four assessments that are consistent 
with that statement: 
There is roughly a 10 percent chance that Iran will achieve this capability, though we have 
low confidence in this estimate since it is based on speculation about Iran’s technical and 
programmatic potential. 
There is roughly a 40 percent chance that Iran will achieve this capability, though we have 
low confidence in this estimate since it is based on speculation about Iran’s technical and 
programmatic potential. 
There is roughly a 10 percent chance that Iran will achieve this capability, and we have high 
confidence in this estimate because it is based on reliable information about Iran’s technical 
and programmatic potential. 
There is roughly a 40 percent chance that Iran will achieve this capability, and we have high 
confidence in this estimate because it is based on reliable information about Iran’s technical 
and programmatic potential. 
None of these statements is particularly precise.
33 But each is unambiguous when it comes to 
predicting likelihoods and saying how reliable those predictions may be. These statements might 
have very different implications for policy,  and the relevant distinctions are essentially lost in 
conventional estimative language.  
Moreover, there is an important class of situations in which little is lost  – and much is gained 
–  by  expressing  likelihood  more  concretely.  When  analysts  deal  with  small  probabilities,  it 
becomes especially important to give a clear sense of what they are. For instance, the risk that 
terrorists will capture nuclear weapons  in Pakistan within the  next  year  is presumably  fairly 
‘low’. But because that event could have such enormous consequences, policymakers need to 
know just how ‘low’ that probability is. Stating that this probability is ‘remote’ – or even stating 
that it is ‘less than five percent’ – allows for interpretations that range over multiple orders of 
magnitude. The odds could be one in a hundred, one in a thousand, or one in a million. Standard 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Uncertainty’ and Joab Rosenberg, ‘The Interpretation of Probability in Intelligence Estimation and 
Strategic Assessment’, Intelligence and National Security 23/2 (2008), pp.139-152. 
33 A reasonable compromise between clearly expressing likelihood and not giving an undue sense of 
scientific precision might be for analysts to assess most probabilities in intervals of five percentage points 
(e.g., 20 percent or 85 percent), while expressing small probabilities in tighter intervals (e.g., 1 percent or 
2 percent).  15 
 
intelligence  terminology  cannot  distinguish  among  these  possibilities,  even  though  the 
differences among them can be critical. 
To illustrate, NIEs throughout the Cold War regularly discuss the risk of the Soviet Union 
launching a conventional or nuclear attack on the United States or its allies. In all cases, the 
likelihood of  major conflict  is predicted to be  low. To give some examples, the NIE  Soviet 
Forces and Capabilities for Strategic Nuclear Conflict (1987) states that ‘the Soviets have strong 
incentives  to  avoid  risking  nuclear  war’.  Implications  of  Recent  Soviet  Military-Political 
Activities (1984) tells readers that despite rhetoric from the Kremlin to the contrary,  ‘we are 
confident that, as of now, the Soviets see not an imminent military clash’. Soviet Capabilities for 
Strategic Nuclear Conflict (1983) states ‘The Soviets, in our judgment, are unlikely to initiate 
nuclear conflict on a limited scale’. Warsaw Pact Concepts and Capabilities for Going to War in 
Europe (1978) judges it to be ‘highly unlikely that the Warsaw Pact nations, or the Soviets alone, 
would deliberately decide to attack member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’.  
Just as policymakers today understand that the probability of a terrorist group capturing a 
Pakistani nuclear weapon is low, most people in the policy community throughout the Cold War 
understood that the risk of a Soviet attack on the United States or its allies was small. But then as 
today, the operative question was how small those chances really were. Assuming that the risk of 
Soviet attack in a given year was one percent would have made for very different policy than 
assuming that it was one hundredth of one percent, yet Cold War NIEs provided little guidance 
on this matter. 
When an estimate simply says some event is ‘unlikely’, it is difficult for readers to weight the 
prediction properly. Some threats are not worth worrying about if they are too  unlikely,  yet 
policymakers may overreact if their consequences are especially dangerous or vivid. Conversely, 
policymakers often have trouble thinking about what small probabilities mean, and sometimes 
effectively treat them as if they were zero. These are both important examples of probability 
neglect. There is a large scholarly literature on how to mitigate these problems by defining and 
presenting probabilities in rigorous, practical, and easily interpretable ways.
34 But mathematics is 
not necessary to understand that it is difficult to m ake wise judgments when policymakers lack 
critical information. Presenting likelihoods vaguely – or not presenting them at all – creates this 
very problem.
35 
                                                   
34 For literature reviews on this subject, see Paul H. Garthwaite, Joseph B. Kadane, and Anthony 
O’Hagan, ‘Statistical Methods for Eliciting Probability Distributions’, Journal of the American Statistical 
Association 100/470 (2005), pp.680-700, and Frederick Mosteller and Cleo Youtz, ‘Quantifying 
Probabilistic Expressions’, Statistical Science 5/1 (1990), pp.2-34. 
35 Another set of cases that is relevant to this argument is a series of NIEs written about potential security 
concerns accompanying presidential visits to various countries: e.g., Security Conditions in China (1972), 
Security Conditions in Mexico (1970); Security Conditions in Mexico City (1968); and The President’s 
Trip to Central America (1968). Each of these estimates the threat to the president’s safety to be low – but 16 
 
The 2002 NIE, Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction provides a 
prominent  illustration.  As  previously  mentioned,  the  NIE  stated,  ‘We  judge  that  Iraq  has 
continued its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs’. There was substantial debate in 
the  intelligence  community  about  the  extent  to  which  the  available  evidence  supported  this 
claim.  Yet  this  assessment  contains  no  information  about  likelihood.  By  leaving  likelihood 
vague, the authors made  it easier  for readers to focus on potential consequences rather than 
expected  consequences,  and  clarifying  this  distinction  was  the  most  important  function  this 
estimate could  have served. Policymakers at the time were already concerned with and well 
aware of the potential consequences of Iraq’s pursuit of WMD. Far less clear was the likelihood 
that Iraq was then pursuing nuclear weapons, and the odds that Iraq would actually obtain them. 
Knowing analysts’ assessments of the matter would reveal the extent to which the potential and 
expected consequences of this outcome might have diverged.  
Making  this  kind  of  determination  is  bound  to  be  difficult  and  contentious.  But  the 
intelligence  community  is  better  positioned  than  policymakers  to  make  an  informed  and 
objective determination on this score. By effectively declining to distinguish between potential 
and expected consequences, the 2002 NIE failed to steer its consumers away from probability 
neglect, or to prevent them from interpreting the report in ways that were consistent with their 
initial preconceptions. This type of misinterpretation can be mitigated by explicitly assessing 
uncertainty. 
A final reason why it is important to separate likelihood and confidence – and to be explicit 
about each – is that this provides information about how those predictions might change if new 
information emerged. In making predictions such as whether Bashar al-Assad would be ousted 
from  the  presidency  of  Syria  in  2012,  it  is  possible  that  analysts  might  be  presented  with 
substantial  evidence  suggesting  al-Assad  would  stay,  alongside  substantial  evidence  that  he 
would go, with the evidence on each side being reasonably compelling. If analysts are dealing 
with  a  large  amount  of  high-quality  information,  then  they  might  state  that the  evidence  is 
ambiguous but extensive. They might predict with relatively high confidence that the odds of al-
Assad  being  ousted  are  roughly  even,  and  these  estimates  would  shift  little  as  a  result  of 
gathering new, small pieces of information. But if analysts only have a few slivers of information 
to work with, then while they might still say that al-Assad has an even chance of being ousted, 
they should also report that these predictions entail relatively low confidence. When analysts 
report low confidence, this implies that gathering more evidence may dramatically alter their 
perceptions. Policymakers might then be inclined to refrain from acting on that assessment until 
more intelligence could be collected, and predictions could be refined.  
This  kind  of  scenario  is  common,  as  policymakers  often  make  important  decisions  about 
whether  to  act  or  to  wait  for  more  information.  Clearly  expressing  both  likelihood  and 
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confidence  may  not  eliminate  the  difficulty  of  making  these  kinds  of  decisions,  but  it  can 
improve the process by giving policymakers a better understanding of what estimates mean and 
how reliable they are. The next section goes into more detail about the reliability of intelligence, 
and how this affects the way that information is filtered through the intelligence cycle. 
 
Filtering information 
Estimative intelligence depends on information that is filtered through myriad layers. NIEs, for 
instance,  draw  on  reports  from  different  intelligence  agencies,  and  only  a  tiny  fraction  of 
information that these agencies collect is actually considered in drafting an estimative product. 
The way information is evaluated and filtered thus provides the foundation for producing quality 
estimates. 
Consider the flow of human intelligence, from the point where it is collected by a case officer 
to the point where that information gets included in a published NIE. This process has several 
stages: a case officer typically receives the information and decides whether to report it, agency 
reviewers receive the information and decide what to pass along to analysts, analysts decide 
whether to use the information in their reports, reports are vetted by colleagues and superiors, 
and some of those reports are then considered in drafting an NIE. At each of these decision nodes 
throughout the analytic chain, some information gets passed along but much information gets 
pared  out.  Some  useful  information  will  inevitably  be  discarded  and  some  misleading  or 
irrelevant information will presumably get through. The question is not whether this filtering 
process is perfect, but whether it systematically favors some kinds of information over others in a 
problematic fashion. Such favoritism could be labeled biased attrition. 
One of the most frequently-criticized forms of biased attrition is the way the intelligence cycle 
tends  to  prioritize  tactical  information  that  can  be  identified  with  precision,  and  to  exclude 
political or strategic information that is harder to know with certainty, but which is often more 
important for making major policy decisions.
36 This ‘fetish for precision over relevance’ is a 
common concern in the intelligence literature.
37 It is also a pattern to be expected  when the 
intelligence community prioritizes eliminating uncertainty. If you believe that  estimates should 
ideally be as close to certain as possible, then it makes sense to use information that is as close to 
certain as possible. Yet an analyst aiming to assess uncertainty would approach the issue  far 
                                                   
36 This has been a long-standing critique: see, for example, Senate Committee on Armed Services, 
Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee [Stennis Report], Investigation of the Preparedness Program, 
88
th Cong., 1
st Sess. (1963), pp.5, 10. For a more recent example, see MG Michael Flynn, Fixing Intel: A 
Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan (Washington, DC: Center for a New American 
Security 2010), p.7. 
37 Jennifer E. Sims, ‘A Theory of Intelligence and International Politics,’ in Treverton and Wilhelm 
Agrell (eds.), National Intelligence Systems: Current Research and Future Prospects (NY: Cambridge 
2009), p.81. 18 
 
differently. If the analyst wishes to make her estimates as accurate as possible, then perfect 
information is no longer necessary. 
To amplify this point, imagine that a case officer receives two reports, from sources perceived 
to be equally unreliable. The first report is that the government of Iran is roughly three years 
from building a nuclear bomb. The second report is that the government of Saudi Arabia is 
roughly three years away from building a nuclear bomb. An intuitive reaction may be to discard 
the second report on the grounds that policymakers and intelligence analysts generally believe 
that Saudi Arabia does not currently have (or wish to have) a nuclear weapons program. But all 
else being equal, the surprising nature of the second report makes it more valuable, not less, 
because  it  could  shift  analysts’  and  policymakers’  views  more  significantly.  Even  if  the 
information comes from a questionable source, it still might be important to follow up on it 
because of its potential impact on the way analysts and policymakers think about security and 
stability in the Middle East. By contrast, the U.S. intelligence community is fully aware of Iran’s 
nuclear program. Having watched the issue closely for years, a large body of information  is 
already available for estimating Tehran’s progress toward a functioning nuclear weapon, and 
properly  incorporating  an unreliable  judgment about Iran’s nuclear capabilities  is unlikely to 
shift expectations significantly.  
This example is hypothetical, but it helps to frame a problem with the way the intelligence 
community  filters  information  on  a  daily  basis.  Most  intelligence  –  and  especially  human 
intelligence  –  passes  through  the  intelligence  cycle  accompanied  by  an  explicit  ‘source 
assessment’.  For  example,  the  U.S.  Army  Field  Manual  on  Human  Intelligence  Collector 
Operations  instructs  practitioners  to  assign  an  ‘alphanumeric  designator’  to  each  piece  of 
information. The letters (A through F) represent ‘source reliability’, and the numbers (1 through 
6) represent ‘information content’.
38 Since the importance of any piece of information depends 
on both its reliability and its content, this seems to provide an adequate foundation for judging 
whether a piece of intelligence is significant.
 
In practice, however, ‘source reliability’ and ‘information content’ are really just two different 
ways of assessing the ‘probable accuracy of the information reported’.
39 Source reliability is 
defined  by  an  informant’s  personal  characteristics,  such  as  whether  they  are  ‘trustworthy’, 
‘authentic’, and ‘competent’. Information content is then defined by whether the source’s report 
has been ‘confirmed by other independent sources’, whether that information is ‘logical in itself’, 
and whether it is ‘consistent with other information on the subject’.
40 These are each important 
                                                   
38 U.S. Army Field Manual 2-22.3, Human Intelligence Collector Operations (Washington, DC: 
Department of the Army 2006), par. 12-12 and appendix B. 
39 Ibid, par. 12-13. 
40 Ibid, par. B-2. As a further indication that ‘information content’ is a way of judging a report’s accuracy, 
it is worth noting that the categories along this scale are defined as ‘confirmed’, ‘probably true’, ‘possibly 
true’, ‘doubtfully true’, ‘improbable’, and ‘cannot be judged’. 19 
 
characteristics  of  an  intelligence  report,  but  they  neglect  to  provide  information  about  how 
consequential the report may be. 
In fact, this source assessment framework may actually reduce the chances that consequential 
information gets passed along. Note how the ‘information content’ of a report is assumed to 
decrease if it has not been confirmed by other sources, or if it is illogical, or if it is not ‘consistent 
with other information on the subject’. Even though intelligence that is inconsistent with prior 
beliefs can be the most important information to consider because it can have the greatest impact 
on overall assessments, analysts are explicitly instructed to downgrade surprising reports. The 
source assessment framework says that ‘the degree of confidence’ an analyst places on a given 
piece  of  information  ‘decreases  if  the  information  is  not  confirmed’;  it  suggests  that  if  an 
intelligence report is ‘contradicted by other information on the subject’ then it is ‘improbable’; 
and the Field Manual says that analysts should ‘[treat] that information with skepticism’.
41 Yet it 
is a mistake to interpret inconsistencies between new information and prior beliefs solely  (or 
even predominantly) through the lens of reliability.  
The problem here is that the reliability of a given piece of evidence is just one component of 
its value. The overall importance of a given piece of information also depends (among other 
factors) on what it says in relation to estimates derived from the body of evidence that is already 
available. The more limited is that body of evidence, or the more that new information appears to 
contradict it, the greater the potential for that information to be important. Just as it is obviously 
problematic to focus on the message and neglect its reliability, it is problematic to focus on the 
reliability and give the message short shrift. This is an important form of consequence neglect 
that existing source assessment frameworks encourage.
42 
The most straightforward way to  modify this system would be  to change the definition of 
‘information content’ so that it captures the extent to which each piece of intelligence provides a 
new  or  original  perspective  on  the  collection  requirement.  The  current  category  of  ‘source 
reliability’ could be broadened to include information about the trustworthiness of the source 
along with whether that source’s report is logical and independently confirmed. This would not 
add undue complexity to the source assessment system, as collectors and analysts are already 
accustomed to using a two-part designation. But the recommendation here would help to ensure 
that  this  designation  captures  both  the  reliability  of  the  information  and  the  potential 
consequences of that information  should it be true. Juggling these attributes requires making 
judgment calls when deciding what to pass along the analytic chain. But appropriate tradecraft 
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can at least ensure that these judgments are based on the relevant inputs, and that none of these 
inputs is systematically neglected.  
To conclude this discussion, it is worth returning to the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor. U.S. 
intelligence had encountered an explicit warning that Japan planned to attack Hawaii in 1941. 
The report came from Joseph Grew, the American ambassador in Tokyo. Grew had received the 
information  from  his  Peruvian  counterpart.  He cabled  the  message  to the  State  Department, 
which then forwarded it to Army and Navy intelligence. Upon further investigation, the Navy 
determined that the Peruvian ambassador had originally received the information from his chef. 
The source was deemed unreliable, and the report was ‘discarded and forgotten’.
43 
There is no doubt, even in hindsight, that the U.S. intelligence community should not have 
grounded strategic warning on the basis of a report from a Peruvian chef. However, it is hardly 
clear that the right move was to ‘discard and forget’ the information. The report had a low degree 
of reliability, but its potential consequences were enormous. Had there been several independent 
reports bearing similar information then there would have been substantial grounds for taking the 
threat seriously. The point here is that it would have been essentially impossible to know that 
such reports existed if they were systematically filtered out of the process before they could be 
considered together. This problem is hardly unique to the events at Pearl Harbor. For instance, a 
U.S. Senate report on the Cuban Missile Crisis concluded that the intelligence community was 
slow to react to the placement of Soviet missiles in Cuba because it disregarded reports by Cuban 
exiles that were deemed to be insufficiently reliable. The Israeli military disregarded warnings of 
an Egyptian attack in 1973 because they were perceived to have a low probability of being true. 
The CIA and FBI did not follow up on a range of questionable leads surrounding the plotters of 
the 9/11 terrorist attacks. These examples are controversial, but they indicate how privileging 
certainty can hinder the flow of information that supports the estimative process.
44 
 
Conclusion 
This article has argued that the goal of estimative intelligence should be to assess uncertainty, 
and  not  to  eliminate  uncertainty.  Certainty  has  intuitive  appeal:  consumers  of  intelligence 
naturally  demand  it,  and  producers  of  intelligence  naturally  wish  to  provide  it.  But  this  is 
precisely why it is important to recognize how striving for certainty can expose the intelligence 
process to numerous flaws, and why it is important to deal with those flaws in structured ways. 
Those  flaws  affect  the  way  analysts  compare  alternative  hypotheses,  the  way  they  express 
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likelihood and confidence, and the way they filter information. In each case, a push for certainty 
can systematically bias the intelligence process. This article suggests ways of adapting existing 
methods  in  order  to  assess  uncertainty,  explains  how  this  represents  a  useful  conceptual 
framework for thinking about estimative intelligence in general, and shows how this framework 
contrasts with many standard aspects of intelligence theory and practice. 
It  is  important to  make  clear  that  the  arguments  in  this  article  are  not  solely  relevant  to 
analysts and other members of the intelligence community. The goal of estimative intelligence is 
to  help  policymakers  deal  with  situations  that  are  uncertain  and  complex.  If  estimative 
intelligence does not address these situations appropriately, then this can adversely affect major 
decisions. Consumers of intelligence have an interest in making sure that this does not happen, 
and they have an important role to play in this process by encouraging (or at least not resisting) 
improvements in tradecraft. Ultimately, this article aims to stimulate discussion about the basic 
analytic foundations of estimative intelligence, and that subject is relevant to a wide range of 
stakeholders. 
In some ways, assessing uncertainty in intelligence entails accepting complexity in the service 
of realistic analysis. For instance, many aspects of estimative intelligence today focus on either 
likelihoods or consequences, while objective analysis requires judging both. Few intelligence 
estimates present both the probability and the confidence of their predictions, and this article 
recommends assessing these factors independently and explicitly.  
Yet it is important to note that the recommendations in this article should also help to avoid 
many  existing  difficulties.  For  instance,  probability  distributions  avoid  the  difficulty  of 
reconciling opposing viewpoints; they reduce the challenge of  judging which  hypotheses are 
‘better’ than others; and they help to obviate debates about what constitutes a ‘significant’ threat. 
Clearly expressing likelihoods helps to prevent confusion about what estimates say and what 
they  imply  for  policymaking.  Assessing  both  likelihood  and  confidence  helps  to  resolve 
disagreements about whether estimates make reliable predictions, whether they are actionable, 
and how much policymakers would benefit by waiting for more information. Improving source 
assessments helps to ensure that analysts and policymakers base their judgments on the most 
important information that is available. In each of these instances, the framework of assessing 
uncertainty helps to mitigate salient problems by improving the conceptual structure surrounding 
challenging issues that intelligence analysts deal with already. 
Estimative intelligence will always be as much art as science, and the result will always be 
imperfect. This  makes  it  all  the  more  important  to  keep the  process  focused  on  the  correct 
objectives, and to avoid unnecessary obstacles or biases. All else being equal, certainty should be 
welcomed when it comes to informing foreign policy. Yet uncertainty is bound to persist on 
critical issues, and when it does, the ultimate goal of estimative intelligence should be to assess 
this uncertainty in a clear and accurate manner.  22 
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